This chapter discusses this volume's contributions by Roberts, De Smet, and Denison because they cover a wide range of explanations of gradience and gradual change. These three approaches can be accounted for in a similar way and I offer an account of gradual change using a Feature Economy Principle. This view is slightly different from that in Roberts' chapter but contributes to the spirit of his chapter in seeing language variation as determined by feature variation. I then provide some new data on the grammaticalization of for that adds to De Smet's data and that fits with a view of gradual change as feature economy. Finally, I suggest that the cases discussed by Denison as non-structural are really structural and again fit in a framework of Feature Economy.
Introduction
This volume examines the connection between gradience and the gradual change so typical of grammaticalization. Gradience involves synchronic continua whereas gradualness and grammaticalization are diachronic. Aarts (2007) and Denison (2001) have given many examples of gradience, where one word is a 'better' category than another. Gradience can of course arise through grammaticalization but need not. Thinking about their exact relationship provides an excellent tool to think about grammatical change, as Rosenbach emphasizes in her contribution. Traugott and Trousdale, the editors, "do not consider diachronic processes themselves to be gradient [but] argue that most instances of change involve small micro-steps that are in fact abrupt" (Traugott and Trousdale, this volume, p. XX) . I agree and will argue that an emphasis on micro-steps suggests that grammaticalization is in fact reanalysis. My view of language change emphasizes acquisition and thereby reanalysis. I will phrase this in terms of features.
others, on the other hand, attribute as little as possible to the role of parameters and to Universal Grammar in general. Minimalist parameters consist of choices of feature specifications as the child acquires a lexicon, as in Borer (1984) , dubbed the Borer Chomsky Conjecture by Baker (2008) . All parameters are lexical and determine linearization; therefore, they account for the variety of languages. Baker's (2001) macroparametric hierarchy is given in Figure 1 . There is very little room for gradual reanalysis here: if a language is reanalyzed as polysynthetic, it suddenly has to decide on headedness and subject position as well. There is in this model no way to account for unidirectionality either.
The model also has a flavor of arbitrariness and is difficult to envision as part of Universal Grammar (see also Baltin 2004: 551) . As I show in van Gelderen (2009) , the settings can change relatively 'fast' in some languages without too many other characteristics changing. For instance, the Northern Athabascan languages lack object polysynthesis whereas the Southern ones have it; otherwise, the two branches are quite similar. This kind of change presents a problem for the hierarchy of macroparameters. In addition, the question arises how this would have come about as an evolutionary shift. Baker (2008: 155) suggests two macroparameters, as in (1) and (2). The choices are 'shallower' than those in Figure 1 and one choice can be easily made, without having to go down a set of choices, as one does in Figure 1 . The 108 languages that Baker (2008) examines fall into four groups and that is predicted by the DAP and CDAP: those with yes/yes, yes/no, no/no, and no/yes. Therefore, according to Baker, the DAP and CDAP "cannot be recast as the assignment of special feature values to individual lexical items; that view would allow different kinds of agreement to be found within a single language" (Baker 2008 ). Baker needs minor parameters too, such as if T is a probe in a particular language and how often it may agree, so that is a problem. The standard Minimalist approach is to account for linguistic diversity in terms of parametrized features. That framework assumes that Case and agreement are always linked which is unlikely given the many languages with agreement and no Case and vice versa. I have provided a possible alternative in Figure 2 , using features. This model allows for micro-reanalyses.
This means that languages could be head-marking, dependent-marking, both, or neither. It has to be coupled with a Feature Economy Principle to derive unidirectionality. If certain features (e.g. uninterpretable) are more economical -perhaps because they keep the derivation going -features will be reanalyzed accordingly.
Other attempts involving parametric features are found in Biberauer and Richards (2006) , Richards (2008) , and Biberauer, Holmberg, Roberts and Sheenan (2009) . Initially, a child would use lexical categories (as well as demonstrative pronouns) with interpretable features (see Radford 2000) . S/he would then hear evidence in English for Phi-features but would have a preference principle and, if not enough external data were available, s/he would analyze the features differently from a previous generation. In approaches such as those represented in Figure 2 , the choices are not as deep and are feature-based. This means that the child may get hints to pay attention to certain features. For instance, if modals are around, a child might postulate a M(ood)P and then needs to decide on the types of features connected to it. The parametric differences expressed in Figure 2 are also in accordance with the view that parameters are only relevant to lexical and grammatical items.
In this section, I have outlined some Minimalist approaches to linguistic diversity and how these relate to gradual, unidirectional language change. Baker's macroparametric approach is hard to use to account for grammaticalization and unidirectional reanalyses; feature-based accounts fare better since they allow for micro-shifts, as I will show below. I first discuss Roberts's contribution since it uses a featural approach.
Features
Roberts thinks of a category in the traditional sense, either as one or the other. However, for him categories come as micro-categories, as in Cinque (1999) . In common with much current generative thinking on grammaticalization, Roberts shows that certain heads move upwards as they grammaticalize. In this section, I will quickly summarize some of the main points in Roberts's feature-based approach; in the next section, I show how some of the cases described by De Smet (this volume) can be accounted for using a (slightly different) featural approach. Cinque (1999) , as is well-known, proposes a fine-grained cartography, part of which is given in (3a), and which might look like (3b) in a structural representation. Roberts then goes on to discuss the well-known grammaticalization of Romance futures and argues for a change from verb to deontic modal to future marker. In other languages, there can be a further change to epistemic modals, as in (4).
(4) (Knock at door): That'll be John. (from Roberts, this volume, example (21)) This is in accordance with moving to the left and up in the tree in Cinque's hierarchy and should be put in terms of features. Roberts then introduces a second mechanism relevant to upwards grammaticalization, namely permutation invariance. Certain nouns become determiners and quantifiers, e.g. 'thing' in French and Arabic becomes a negative. This change can be represented as one from (5a) to (5b), certainly a loss of lexical meaning but not of semantic complexity.
(5) a. λx (thing (x)) ("the set of x such that x is a thing")
("the sets P and Q such that nothing is in both").
He attempts to link this to the reanalysis of a lower word as a higher one. The change of a verb to a modal to a future marker may involve such an increase but not all cases of grammaticalization do. As Roberts himself puts it: "it remains unclear whether we can consider the higher functional categories to be featurally simpler" (p. XX). According to Roberts, we need "an appropriate feature system which breaks down major categories (N, V, etc.) into smaller ones (count noun, transitive verb, etc.) up to a fairly fine-grained level. In the case of functional categories, which will be the major concern in what follows, we will be dealing with categories such Modal, which can be divided into epistemic, alethic, deontic, etc. " (p. XX). Such a refinement definitely is needed.
For me, one question is what motivates the upwards movement. If the features of the higher position are simpler, there is a reason why a language learner would simplify the item. In agreement with Roberts and Roussou (2003) , Roberts (this volume), and van Gelderen (2004 van Gelderen ( , 2008a and others, it seems that, in all cases where we have upwards reanalysis, the reanalyzed element is at some point associated with two positions but the higher position has different features. A good example of that is the shift of for from preposition to complementizer. I will therefore discuss the case as presented in De Smet (this volume) and then reanalyze it in terms of upward reanalysis and feature simplification.
4.
From P to C
De Smet (this volume) examines the phenomenon of grammatical interference, the "diachronic process by which a grammatical item is attracted to a different category without being absorbed by it" (p. XX). De Smet's assumptions and mine are very different. He is very structuralist in his emphasis on a word's "journey through a language's categorical space" (De Smet, this volume, p. XX) whereas I see grammaticalization as the consequence of internal pressure on the language learner. I will therefore focus on the data rather than on theoretical differences. De Smet's case studies involve the subject marker for and the particles out and forth. I will focus on the former in Section 4.1 and argue that the changes involving for present a clear instance of upward grammaticalization. De Smet examines for from Middle English on. I will add the picture for Old English in Section 4.2 and show how for turns from a preposition into a complementizer. This is much updated from van Gelderen (1993 van Gelderen ( , 1998 van Gelderen ( , 2008c . In Section 4.3, I then add the reanalyses in Middle English.
De Smet
De Smet's aim is to examine "the simultaneous associations with different categories that items under change can maintain, and what this can reveal about decategorialization and persistence in grammaticalization" (De Smet, this volume, p. XX). The category of for is, of course, both a P and a C in contemporary (and Middle) English. De Smet emphasizes the original purpose function and argues that the complementizer arose as a reinforcer of the to-infinitive and is not reanalyzed from the preposition for (p. XX). It is never clear what category this reinforcing for, e.g. in Middle English (6) or (7), is.
(6) for ðe folke to kastin to the people to chastise 'to chastise the people. ' (from De Smet, this volume, example (4)) (7) se kyng hit dide for to hauene sibbe of se earl Angeow 'the king did it (for) to have a relation from Earl A. ' (Peterborough Chronicle 1127; from Visser 1972 from Visser : 1001 De Smet says that the disappearance of this reinforcing use of for "roughly fits" (p. XX) with the disappearance of OV-order, but that's not the case in (7) which is VO and which continues in a second clause, given as (8), i.e. with an OV. Although one might argue the NP sibbe of se earl Angeow in (7) is 'heavy' and therefore extraposed, there are lots of other early for to examples with VO, as in (9), where the object is not heavy. The earliest instance of a structure such as (10) that Visser provides is from the mid 15th century. Having for be a reinforcer early on (in (6) to (9)) and not a preposition and having it look like the preposition later (in (10)) seems to me ad hoc in De Smet's account. Another quotation from De Smet (this volume) emphasizes this shifting allegiance of for again:
Subject-marker for and the preposition for are syntactically and semantically sufficiently different to treat them as homonyms, yet something -we may assume formal similarity -causes the subject-marker to keep gravitating toward the preposition and to model its distribution after that of the preposition. (p. XX) So, before 1400, for is a reinforcer and cannot be a preposition or complementizer, according to De Smet, but after 1400 it starts to look to the preposition as a model to gravitate towards. This part is not well argued. I turn to an earlier stage of the development of for and show how it was reanalyzed as a complementizer, and then speculate how a similar account could work for the later stages, i.e. the introduction of the subject marker.
4.2
From PP to C As is well known, the earliest use in English of for is as preposition and only after 1150 is it a complementizer. In early Old English, e.g., Beowulf 's (11), a spatial/ locational meaning can be observed. There is also an early temporal meaning for for(e) in (12), but this is infrequent.
(11) hlynode for hlawe made-noise before mound 'It made noise before/around the gravehill. ' (Beowulf 1120, Klaeber edition) (12) ða geworden aron in iuh for long in asca … dydon 7 worhton which become are in you for long in ashes … did and made 'which were done in you (they) long ago would have repented. ' (Lindisfarne Matthew 11.21, Skeat edition)
More frequent, already at that point, is the use as a purpose marker, as in (13) and (14). Note that the PPs in both (13) and (14) are preposed and this is very frequent as well.
(13) wen ic þaet ge for wlenco nalles for wraecsiðum. ac expect I that you for daring not.at.all for misery/exile but for higeþrymmum Hroðgar sohton. for greatness.of.heart Hrothgar sought 'I expect you were seeking Hrothgar for daring and greatness of heart rather than for being exiled. ' The purpose marker in e.g. (14) is typically a predecessor of the cause meaning in (17). Heine et al. (1991: 157) , Traugott and König (1991) , and Sweetser (1990) The meanings connected to for in (6), (7), (13), and (14) are purpose, but in later Old English, e.g., the Peterborough Chronicle's (17), for is also used as a preposition of causation. The passage from which (17) is taken is a twelfth century addition to the entry for the year 675, one which the other versions lack. The preposing of the PP continues into Middle English, as in (18) (Peterborough Chronicle, 1135, 8) This locates the first use of the causal complementizer for with the second scribe of the Peterborough Chronicle, who starts adding information from 1132 on. Between 1135 and 1154, the use increases dramatically compared to the period before 1135, since the next year that has an entry, 1137, has 7 instances. The Middle English of one hundred years later of course has many variants, as in (22) to (24), which according to De Smet would be instances of reinforcers, but which I think are a natural progression of the preposition, from purpose preposition to purpose complementizer. (22) Variants of forte are also used as finite complementizers with the meaning of 'until' , as in (25) and for is used in the Otho version of Layamon where to is used in Caligula, as in (26).
(25) forte hii to see come 'until they came to sea. ' (Layamon, Otho 5971) (27) . With ðe present, there is no verb-second, indicating ðe is in C and the PP for þaem in the specifier position, as shown in (28).
(27) ac for þaem þe hie us near sint, we … ne magon but for that that they us close are, we … not may 'but because they are near to us, we can't … (Orosius, Bately 122.18-19)
for that C TP þe If the PP is topicalized and functions as complementizer, what happens to the features? I have put the developments in (29). I assume the C (when the PP is topicalized) is not specified for purpose (yet) or isn't even present, as in (29a), but that the semantic features of [purpose] connected to for express that. When the PP is base generated in the CP, [purpose] is analyzed as an [iF] on for, as in (29b). After the reanalysis of for as C in (29c), for may keep those [iF] features. Alternatively, if it loses them, a new purpose element (e.g. an adverbial) inside the VP has to be added. A complete picture of the changes is given structurally in (29) and in terms of Feature Economy in (30):
[uCase]
A similar development would have to be sketched for the causal P and C but I will not go into that here due to space constraints. Concluding so far, Feature Economy is argued to be a motivating force of linguistic change, accounting for the change from specifier to higher specifier (in the case of the PPs) and head to higher head (in the case of modals). The reason is that these principles help a child reanalyze their linguistic input. I have reformulated the Late Merge Principle as a Feature Economy Principle in (30) (see also van Gelderen 2008c) . Feature loss, I argue, can then be responsible for certain changes. One can think of feature loss as happening through the addition of certain words to the lexicon with different features. I will now turn to the change to for as a subject marker.
4.3
For as subject marker
De Smet provides (10) above and (31) as examples of for as marking the subject of the infinitive.
(31) Also it ys a certayn techinge for hele to be keped, þat a man vse metys þat accordyn to his complexioun and nature 'Furthermore, it is certain advice for health to be kept that a man must use food that accords to his constitution and nature. ' (from De Smet, this volume, example (3))
We have discussed De Smet's account of the introduction of structures like (31) above. How could we account for this in terms of Feature Economy? I think we could go back to early explanations, e.g. Visser (1972) , that make use of the 2. Note that only a non-finite TP is compatible with a purpose C. As far as I know, there is no complementizer agreement on non-finite Cs and hence, the [u-phi] features may be absent too.
ambiguity of for in (10), (15), and (31). 3 The earliest instance of for as a subject marker that I know is (32) and that for certainly is ambiguous.
(32) make 3e redi a hors for poul to ride on 'Make ready a horse for Paul to ride on. ' (Wycliff Acts 23, from Visser 988; see van Gelderen 1993: 133) Since for is available as a preposition and a complementizer, the reanalysis in (33) is not strange.
(33)
[uCase] DP [u-purpose] [FUT]
In this section, I have shown how one might go about using Feature Economy to account for the changes involving the preposition for. I now turn to some other category switches.
Small changes or gradient ones?
Denison (this volume) further considers cases that are challenges for strict categories. In this section, I show how some of the changes Denison discusses are clear reanalyses in higher positions with a loss of phi-features (in accordance with Late Merge/Feature Economy). Denison says of the changes he discusses: " [t] his is gradience -micro-steps rather than abrupt saltation from N to A" and "non-structural" (Denison, this volume, p. XX) . I don't think anyone argues for an abrupt saltation from N to A or from A to D but I do think the small changes are structural. Here, I just discuss Denison's data in the light of work by Adamson (2000, not cited by Denison) and by Breban (2008, cited by Denison) on adjectives. Adamson (2000: 46) provides some examples, such as rotten and dark, that change over time to have more subjective meanings. For instance, the early meaning of rotten is 'sense of decay' and the later one is 'worthless' . Most of her article is about the adjective 'lovely' . In Old English, it meant 'loving' and 'amiable'; in Middle English, it had become 'physically beautiful' and that value judgment was 3. There are many subsequent accounts which I do not have space to go into here. extended past the physical in later stages. Adamson emphasizes the position of the adjectives. As they become more subjective, they move to the left (or 'up the tree'). In the period between 1500 and 1600, 34% are leftmost and after 1900 91% are. She also looks at the Ns modified by 'lovely' . They change from 'face, creature' to 'laziness' and 'letters' in the 1950s. This is clearly a category change, but one that goes through small stages. There are, of course, a number of proposals for the ordering of adjectives, e.g. Dixon (1982) and Cinque (to appear), and the changes follow a path upwards and leftwards. Breban (e.g. in Breban 2008) looks at adjectives of difference, namely different, distinct, diverse, several, sundry, and various. Like Adamson, she tests what she calls the leftward movement hypothesis (Breban 2008: 298) and says that the adjectives of difference provide additional evidence for Adamson's claim. Her tables for each of these adjectives show a gradual change from 1250 to now, where some, e.g. several and sundry are now only used as quantifiers. Hence, the change is structural.
Denison says that "[w]hile the conversion A > N can be brought about by ellipsis (hopeful, daily, bitter) , which is an abrupt process, I suggested that N > A was stepwise" (Denison, this volume, p. XX) . I agree with this distinction between the two changes. One of Denison's examples of a change from Noun to Adjective is rubbish, as in (34), where it is used as predicative adjective modified by an adverb.
(34) The light seems very rubbish.
Denison posits as conditions for this reanalysis a possibility of the noun to appear without D and to be gradable. This change involves loss of content. It might be helpful to consider Baker (2003) , who argues that difference between nouns and adjectives is that the former have referential features. If that is correct, we could again think of this change as a reanalysis up the tree (from N to A) and with a loss of referential features. The same is true with the change from adjective to determiner, so frequent in the history of English, and discussed by Denison in Section 1.3, again as a "non-structural change. "
There are a number of times when I realize definitions are so differently used. For instance, what is to Denison a non-structural change (his Section 1) seems to me clearly structural. This must also be the reason that I don't understand the sentence "strict structuralism isn't always the most insightful way of looking at things, and grammatical change is one domain where it does less well" (Denison, this volume, p. XX) .
In Section 5, I have briefly mentioned the problem that what looks nonstructural to one linguist (e.g. Denison) looks structural to another (e.g. me).
Furthermore, the changes involving nouns, adjectives, and demonstratives follow usual pathways of change (e.g. Late Merge).
Directionality and renewal
Not many in the volume discuss the directionality of the changes. The grammaticalization literature is of course full of such examples. What I would like to point out here is that Feature Economy provides an account of the unidirectionality and also where the renewal will come from. In Table 2 , typical instances of grammaticalization are provided and the sources of renewal are the left-most elements. They can be full phrases as well as single lexical items and are more clearly provided in Table 3 .
These examples are familiar from the vast literature on grammaticalization, e.g. Heine and Kuteva (2002) . The reason for the choice of sources of renewal mentioned in Table 3 is that they provide new semantic features for what was 'grammaticalized away': person and number (phi-features) in the case of agreement and copulas, negative features in the case of negatives, spatial features in the case of prepositions, and so on. Once the functional element has lost its semantic and interpretable features, this would be formulated within a Minimalist framework as becoming a probe looking for an element to value its features. Some elements are straightforward renewers: demonstratives have phi-features and can renew agreement and adverbs have temporal or spatial features and renew prepositions and complementizers.
Conclusion
In this commentary, I have discussed three chapters that deal with micro-reanalyses and have suggested a way to look at these in terms of Feature Economy. I think we should stop worrying about whether change is gradual or not (it seems to be agreed by most that it is) or directional or not.
